Cheshire Resilience Forum

Working together to prepare for emergencies

CRF Major Incident Response Principles

V11.4 Nov 22 Official

Ownership and Authorisation – this document has been coordinated and prepared by Cheshire Resilience Forum's Management Group. Ownership rests with Cheshire Resilience Forum. All agencies were consulted on the content.

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Reviews – these principles will be reviewed on an annual basis and record made of amendments.

Version Control		
Version	**Date**	**Changes**
11.0	Sept 22	Draft version following full review of Generic response manual commenced in July 22.
11.1	Sept 22	Updates following consultation process including grammatical errors, revised material and diagrams
11.2	Oct 22	Updated Notification process from Police Updated Notification detail from NWAS
11.3	Nov 22	Updates following EPC Strategic Training day including: Objectives should be hierarchal to aid prioritisation pg 16 Preconditions for Recovery pg **Action Cards for** Incident Definitions Multi Agency Airwave Channels Aide Notification Cascade JESIP Aide Memoir Updated Template Agenda Coordination Groups
11.4	Nov 22	Revised Font Revisions following consultation and debrief of Extreme Heat

ACTION CARDS

Important Note

The following Action Cards can be found at the end of this plan and will provide quick reference guides to the following:

Incident Definitions

Multi Agency Airwave Channels

Notification Cascade

JESIP Aide Memoir

Agenda for Coordination groups

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1. Introduction

1.1 **The aim of these principles** is to provide guidance for the multi-agency response to Major Incidents in Cheshire.

1.2 **Objectives for these principles**

a) promote and enhance interoperability;
b) define procedures and arrangements for coordinating the multi-agency response;
c) provide a briefing and training aid;
d) signpost the key plans and procedures produced by CRF;
e) define the roles and responsibilities of responding agencies.

1.3 **Limits** – these principles are <u>not</u>:

a) intended to provide detail on topic specific or agency specific plans;
b) intended to replace an organisation's own plans and statutory duties;
c) a business continuity plan.

1.4 **Territorial Extent**

a) these multi-agency arrangements may be established when managing:
- a response to a Major Incident within Cheshire,
- the effects of a Major Incident outside Cheshire but impacting upon Cheshire;

b) Cheshire is defined as geographical area encompassing the following local authorities:
- Cheshire East Council,
- Cheshire West and Chester Council,
- Halton Borough Council, and
- Warrington Borough Council.

1.5 **Testing and Validation** – the principles will be tested and validated by reference in local exercises and via use during any multi-agency response to an emergency incident.

1.6 **Review and Amendments** – these principles will be subject to ongoing review and revision as new guidance becomes available or where lessons are learned through incidents. As a minimum, they will be reviewed on a three yearly basis. All amendments will be communicated to partner agencies.

2. Definitions of 'Major Incident', MI Standby & Cloudburst

2.1. A **"*Major Incident*"** is defined by national doctrine as

"an event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies."

The term 'emergency responder agencies' describes all Category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.

A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.

A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.

The severity of consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.

2.2. A **"*Major Incident – Standby*"** - is defined as any incident which is NOT a "Major Incident", but:

a) has the potential to develop into a "Major Incident"; or
b) involves contamination of the environment, water courses or air pollution; or
c) involves evacuation or the potential for evacuation of any members of the public; or
d) involves major road closures; or
e) involves the distribution of specific health advice to any members of the public; or
f) has a significant impact on service delivery; or
g) is likely to cause public concern.

2.3. **Cloudburst Supplementary Definitions**

2.3.1 **"*Primary Cloudburst*"**

a) this term would be used in the event of a ***major accident***[1] at a 'Upper Tier' COMAH site involving the release of a toxic gas or other dangerous substance within the COMAH regulations.

b) the declaration is normally made by the site operator but, in light of circumstances, may be made by the senior officer of any emergency services present at the incident. The occurrence must have the potential to affect areas outside the boundary of the premises.

1 the term ***major accident*** is defined in the COMAH Regulations and is used when an incident involves the release of one or more dangerous substances. Local Authorities have an external emergency plan for each Upper Tier COMAH site.

2.3.2 **"*Secondary Cloudburst*"**– is defined as:

a) this term would be used in the event of an incident involving the release of a toxic gas or chemical at premises other than a 'Upper' COMAH site.

b) the occurrence must have the potential to pose a serious danger to human health or the environment outside the boundary of the premises.

c) this will normally be declared by the most Senior Manager from Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service (CFRS) present at the location.

2.3.3 ***"Mobile Cloudburst*** – is defined as:

a) this term is used in the event of an incident involving toxic gas or chemical release at a location such as highways, railways, shipping or pipelines.

b) the occurrence must have the potential to pose a serious danger to human health or the environment in the surrounding area.

c) this will normally be declared by the most Senior Manager from Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service (CFRS) present at the location.

2.3.4. ***"HEXAFLOW"*** – is defined as:

a) this term would be used in the event of a ***major accident*** at a REPPIR site involving the release of a toxic gas or other dangerous substance within the REPPIR regulations.

b) the declaration is normally made by the site operator but, in light of circumstances, may be made by the senior officer of any emergency services present at the incident. The occurrence must have the potential to affect areas outside the boundary of the premises.

3. Declaration of "Major Incident"

3.1. Declaration

A multi-agency major incident may be declared by one or more of the responding agencies who considers that any of the definitions in Section 2 have been satisfied. The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers.

Any agency requiring the declaration of a multi-agency major incident or major incident standby should contact Cheshire Constabulary's Force Incident Manager (FIM) in the first instance. An agency should not be criticised for declaring a major incident in the first instance, even if events later prove it not to be so.

It is also recognised that a declaration may occur as a result of a threshold met as part of a contingency response plan, ie Severe Weather Warning.

When declaring a multi-agency major incident or major incident standby it should be recognised, depending on the nature of the incident, that:

a) all local agencies may not be required to respond;
b) it is the responsibility of each agency to determine their level of response once notified.

It is for this reason:

a) that the need for a multi-agency major incident declaration or major incident standby; and
b) which agencies need to be notified of the major incident declaration or major incident standby,

are subject to a risk assessment, often by a multi-agency group, either at scene or via teleconference.

What may be regarded as a major incident by one agency may not be regarded as a major incident by another agency. Each agency is therefore responsible for undertaking their own risk assessment, governed by their own policies and procedures, to determine the nature of their agency's response.

3.2 Considering the Response – Assessing the Risk

Once an incident occurs consideration will be given as to whether a multi-agency response is necessary.
In the initial stages of the response to any incident, the most Senior Police Officer (i.e., the Force Incident Manager (FIM), the Police Tactical Commander, the Police Strategic Commander, or a combination of these officers) will, in liaison with the other multi-agency responders, undertake a ***Dynamic Risk Assessment*** to consider

c) whether or not a multi-agency response is required (if not mandated), and
d) if a multi-agency response is required, whether that will need a Joint Tactical Co-ordination Group (JTCG) and / or a Strategic Co-ordination Group (SCG) established.

The diagram overleaf outlines the ***Dynamic Risk Assessments*** undertaken to determine the nature of the multi-agency response.



NOTE – multi-agency command and control meetings can take place in 3 main ways:

1. Via a teleconference/virtual meeting organised by Cheshire Constabulary
2. Via the opening of the appropriate Co-ordination Centre
3. Via a combination of physical and virtual (hybrid) co-ordination

4. Notification Procedures

When a Major incident or Major Incident Standby has been declared:

a) The Cheshire Police Force Control Centre (FCC), or Contingency Planning Team, will notify partner agencies by sending out a Resilience Direct (RD) Notification to category 1 and 2 agencies which will include the incident METHANE report.

b) In addition, Cheshire Police will telephone Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service, North West Ambulance Service, Environment Agency Control Rooms and the relevant Local Authority Contact Centre to ask them to notify their on duty NILO/officer of the declaration. Brief details of the incident will be provided and directed to the RD Notification for further information.

c) Further agencies will be telephoned, depending on the type of incident, as required.

d) It is for each agency, once notified, to determine the level of their own response subject to their agency's own Dynamic Risk Assessment.

Early notification to Responders is essential and information needs to be updated constantly as the incident progresses allowing a measured and appropriate response.

The RD Notification will continue to be utilised to notify agencies of the times of any TCG or SCG and the format of these, ie., co-locating at the JTCC, teleconference or MS Teams, and any further information and supporting documents during the incident.
Once it is determined who should be notified the notification diagram below identifies which agency has responsibility for contacting other agencies / organisations.

Notification Diagram for Emergencies



5. Interoperability Response Principles

The multi-agency response to incidents within the County is based on the principles contained within edition 3 of the "Joint Doctrine: The interoperability framework" published April 2022. The Joint Doctrine provides a framework on which we have built our joint response, by using commonly agreed models and principles.

5.1. **Co-location -** On scene (Operational) commanders from all organisations present should co-locate at a Forward Command Post (FCP) as early as possible to allow them to establish jointly agreed objectives and a coordinated plan of action. At certain locations within Cheshire, particularly COMAH or REPPIR sites, on scene commanders may choose to co-locate at a pre-designated area such as the On Site Emergency Coordination Centre (OSECC).

Commanders may need to move away from the FCP in order to direct the actions of their own organisation. Should this be necessary the use of an interoperable talkgroup should be considered to ensure that commanders are still able to communicate.

Tactical and Strategic Commanders should co-locate at designated Tactical or Strategic Coordination Centres. Where this is not possible or practical, for example due to the impact of severe weather or traffic disruption, virtual meeting or teleconference facilities should be used to ensure the effective sharing of information and the establishment of shared situational awareness.

It is essential that commanders are easily identifiable particularly when on scene at an incident. Where available, tabards must be worn by each commander. There may be exceptions to this for incidents such as public order where other identification methods are used.

Fire

Police

Ambulance

5.2. **Communication** is the passage of clear, unambiguous and timely information relevant to an emergency situation. The sharing of information, free of acronyms, across service boundaries is essential to operational success. This should commence from the earliest possible moment after the first information on a developing incident is received by an emergency control centre.

The M/ETHANE model is an established reporting framework which provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share major incident information. Each responder agency should send a M/ETHANE message to their control room as soon as possible.

The information received through multiple M/ETHANE messages will gradually build to support shared situational awareness in those responding to the incident and between control rooms (JESIP, 2021).



5.3 **Coordination** is the integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives. Effective co-ordination generally requires one service to act in a lead capacity. Whilst the lead organisation is generally the Police Service, it will be dependent on the type of incident. The lead organisation may change as the incident develops, for example there may be a handover between Police and Local Authority as the incident moves from response to recovery.

Coordination is achieved through the application of command groups as shown below:



5.4 **Joint understanding of risk** is the process by which commanders work towards a common understanding of threats, hazards and the likelihood of them being realised, in order to inform decisions on deployments and risk control measures that are required. It is recognised that agencies may view and respond to risks differently, therefore sharing of information is pivotal in order that commanders can build and maintain a common understanding. This will include ensuring the safety of responders and mitigating the impact of risks to members of the public, infrastructure and the environment.

5.5 **Shared situational awareness** is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the priorities of the emergency services and responder agencies.

Achieving shared situation awareness is essential for effective interoperability. Establishing shared situational awareness is important for a common understanding at all levels of command, between incident commanders and control rooms.

Establishment of shared situational awareness is aided by the use of the Joint Decision Model and M/ETHANE.

5.6 Joint Decision Model

One of the difficulties facing commanders from different organisations in a joint emergency response is how to bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and then make effective decisions together. The Joint Decision Model (JDM), shown below, has been developed to enable this to happen and will be used during an incident by multi-agency commanders at all levels to assist with decision-making.



5.6.1 Working Together, Saving Lives, Reducing Harm

The pentagon at the centre of the JDM reminds responders that all joint decisions should be made with reference to the overarching or primary aim of any response to an emergency – to save lives and reduce harm. This drives a people centred approach with a concern for public and responder wellbeing throughout the response.

This should be the most important consideration throughout the decision-making process.

5.6.2 Gather Information and Intelligence

At any incident, no single responder agency can appreciate all the relevant dimensions of an emergency straight away. Information refers to all forms of information obtained, recorded or processed (e.g. M/ETHANE messages).

A deeper and wider understanding will only come from meaningful communication between responder agencies, and responders should not assume that others will see or say things in the same way. There may need to be a sustained effort to reach a common view of understanding of events, risks and implications.Anyone providing sensitive information should also provide an understanding of how it can be used, shared and stored.

5.6.3 Assess Threat and Risk and Develop a Working Strategy

Responders should jointly assess the situation, including any specific threats, hazards and the risk of harm. They should consider how risks may increase, reduce, or be controlled by any decisions made and subsequent actions taken. At any incident, each responder agency will have a unique insight into those risks.

By sharing what they know, responders can establish a common operating picture (COP). This allows for informed decision making on deployments and the risk control measures required. Time critical tasks should not be delayed by this process.

When developing a working strategy, responders should consider:

- **What**: Are the aims and objectives?
- **Who by**: Lead Agency, Cat 1 responders, Emergency Services?
- **When**: Timescales, deadlines and milestones?
- **Where**: Locations?
- **Why**: What is the rationale? Is it consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?
- **How**: Will these tasks be achieved?

5.6.4 Consider Powers, Policies and Procedures

Decision making in an emergency will focus on achieving the desired outcomes. Various constraints and considerations will shape how this is achieved.

Powers, policies and procedures may affect how individual agencies operate and co-operate to achieve the agreed aims and objectives, which should reflect their statutory duties. A common understanding of relevant powers, policies and procedures is essential to ensure that the activities of responder agencies compliment, rather than compromise each other.

5.6.5 Identify Options and Contingencies

Responders should work together to evaluate the range of options and contingencies. Options or courses of actions should consider:

- **Suitability**: Does it fit with the strategic direction?
- **Feasibility**: Can it be done with the available resources?
- **Acceptability**: Is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

Whichever options are chosen, it is essential responders are clear on what they need to carry out. Procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic should also be clearly documented and shared. Contingency arrangements should be put in place to address reasonably foreseeable events that may occur as a result of action taken or not taken.

5.6.6 Take Action and Review

Building shared situational awareness, setting direction, evaluating options and making decisions all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

Actions and the subsequent outcomes should be regularly reviewed. As information or intelligence becomes available or changes during the incident, responders should use the JDM to inform their decision making until the incident is resolved.

6. Command and Control

Within Cheshire the Operational, Tactical and Strategic levels of command may be established in order to effectively manage the response to a major incident. The nature of the incident will determine whether all levels of command are required.

For national and wider incidents elements or all of the central government response may be activated. The following graphic demonstrates the potential structures:

Command and Control Structure for Major Incidents

(National and wider elements activated as appropriate)



6.1 Aims and objectives of the Multi-Agency Response

A key function of command is to agree the aims and objectives of any multi-agency response. The following are examples, of which a number may be selected for any emergency: Objectives should be numbered and in an hierarchical order to assist prioritisation of actions.

- save life and prevent further loss of life,
- relieve suffering,
- communicate – warn and inform – both the public and all responders,
- protect the health and safety of responders,
- safeguard the environment,
- protect property (as far as is practicable),
- maintain or restore critical activities,
- maintain normal services at an appropriate level,
- promote / facilitate self-help.

6.2 Operational Command Tier

The principles of interoperability will be applied by personnel first on the scene of a major incident and assess the nature and extent of the issues. Operational commanders will concentrate their effort and resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility – for example, the police will concentrate on establishing cordons, maintaining security and managing traffic.

Individual agencies retain command authority over their own resources and personnel deployed at the scene, but each agency must liaise and coordinate with all other agencies involved, ensuring a coherent and integrated effort.

It should be understood that the titles do not convey seniority, but depict the function carried out by that particular person. From the earliest possible opportunity it is important that the senior officers of each agency at the scene liaise with each other. This will be the foundation upon which all later coordination will be based.

6.3 Tactical Command Tier

Purpose - the purpose of the "tactical" level is to ensure that the actions taken by the operational level are coordinated, coherent and integrated in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. This may require a **Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG)** to be established.

Role of JTCG – Will provide the multi-agency tactical coordination of the response to the incident. Working in coordination, the responder agencies tactical commanders will:

a) determine priorities for allocating available resources;
b) plan and coordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken;
c) obtain additional resources if required;
d) assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of operational commanders; and
e) ensure the health and safety of the public and personnel.

The activation of a JTCG is intended to ensure that any information that is available is shared and used in determining appropriate actions to mitigate the effects of the incident.

Although each of the senior officers at the tactical level will have specific service or agency responsibilities, together they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and co-ordination required to deliver successful outcomes

Chair - at the outset a Senior Police Officer will act as Chair of the JTCG and has the responsibility for the tactical direction of the incident and ensuring that the tactical decision making process is documented. However, the Chair may be handed over to a more appropriate person from another agency depending on the nature of the emergency.

Escalation to the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) - in those cases where it becomes clear that resources, expertise or co-ordination are required beyond the capacity of the tactical level (e.g. where there is more than one scene or incident), it may be necessary to invoke the strategic level of management to take overall command and set the strategic direction.

Locations – Tactical Coordinating groups may meet in three ways:

Physical: the JTCG will normally be located at Cheshire Constabulary's Headquarters at Winsford. This will be designated as the Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre (JTCC).

Virtual: Coordination meetings will be conducted in a remote manner utilising digital contact methods.

Hybrid: Mixture of both Physical and Virtual Coordination Groups

The decision as to how the meetings will be conducted rests with the chair of the respective coordinating group and will be guided by the nature of the incident and its longevity.

6.4 Strategic Command Tier

Purpose - where the scale, impact or nature of the incident requires a ***Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)*** to be formed they will:

a) consider the emergency in its wider context;
b) determine longer-term and wider impacts and risks with strategic implications;
c) define and communicate the overarching strategy and objectives for the multi-agency emergency response;
d) establish the framework, policy and parameters for the tactical and operational levels;
e) monitor the context, risks, impacts and progress towards defined objectives.

Role of SCG –

a) determine and promulgate a clear strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly;
b) establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation;
c) prioritise the requirements of the tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources accordingly;
d) formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans, potentially delegating this to one responding agency; and
e) direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.

Strategic level representatives nominated to attend the must be empowered to take corporate decisions on behalf of their parent organisation in support of the overall SCG strategy. It is therefore essential that strategic representatives are invested with the authority necessary to undertake the role and provided with the necessary back up and support to ensure any undertaking given by them to the SCG is actionable.

Chair - at the outset a Senior Police Officer will act as Chair of the SCG and has the responsibility for the strategic direction of the incident and ensuring that the strategic decision making process is documented. However, the Chair may be handed over to a more appropriate person from another agency depending on the nature of the emergency.

Location - the SCG will meet at in a manner or location to be determined by the Chair of the SCG. If meeting physically this will normally be Cheshire Constabulary's Headquarters in Winsford. This will be designated as the ***Strategic Coordinating Centre (SCC).*** The options of physical, virtual and hybrid are available.

6.5 Central Government Involvement

Central Government coordination and support for a national or significant incident is usually undertaken from the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and may be led by the Prime Minister (or Senior Minister nominated by the Prime Minister). There are a number of roles which support the coordination at a local level.

Government Liaison Officer (GLO) - the role of the Government Liaison Officer (GLO) is to:

a) facilitate two-way communications between central government and local responders;
b) facilitate the provision of support.

In most cases for Cheshire, the Government Liaison Officer (GLO) will be a member of the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Resilience and Emergencies Division North (DLUHC-RED) and will carry out the role from either their office or through deployment to the SCG. In some cases, a major incident may be managed effectively at operational or tactical level but because of the nature of the incident (likely to generate a high level of media or ministerial interest), a GLO may still be appointed.

Government Liaison Team (GLT) - where the scale of the incident requires it, the GLO may be supported by other officials from the DLUHC-RED and/or from a central government department(s) to form the Government Liaison Team (GLT). In the event of a terrorist emergency the Home Office will deploy GLT and the DLUHC-RED will deploy a Consequence Management Liaison Officer (CMLO). Where multiple SCGs are established, a GLO or GLT will be provided for each SCG.

Common Recognised Information Picture – the GLT will facilitate the development of this incident specific, nationally agreed, reporting template. It is likely that the SCG, the JTCG and, through these Coordinating Groups, individual agency control rooms will be asked to provide information to support the completion / maintenance of the Common Recognised Information Picture.

Response Coordination Group (ResCG) - while most emergencies are dealt with by responders at the local level through SCGs, a Response Coordination Group (ResCG) may be convened where the response to an emergency would benefit from some co-ordination or enhanced support at a cross-SCG level. This is most likely when an incident affects two or more police force areas, or has the potential to do so. In such circumstances, the DLUHC-RED may on its own initiative, or at the request of local responders, or the Lead Government Department (LGD) in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a ResCG in order to bring together appropriate representatives from:

a) each local SCGs - i.e., the Chair or Chief of Staff - where activated,
b) representatives of the relevant organisations if the SCGs have not been activated – i.e., if the incident primarily affects Local Authorities, then it may be appropriate for only Local Authorities to be represented at the ResCG.

Recovery Coordination Group (RCG) – in the same way that the recovery issues are usually dealt with by responders at the local level through local Recovery Working Groups (RWG), it may be necessary to coordinate recovery issue across a wider footprint. In these circumstances the DLUHC-RED may on its own initiative, or at the request of local responders, or the Lead Government Department (LGD) in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a Recovery Coordination Group (RCG). Membership and working arrangements would be developed at the time.

The Chairs of the Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) may need to consider whether they need additional advice and support to assist them in managing the consequences of an emergency. The additional groups established will be dependent up the following Dynamic Risk Assessments outlined in the diagram overleaf**.**



7.1 Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

The STAC provides timely and coordinated scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to either the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) or the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) during an emergency. It will:

- Provide a single point of scientific advice to the SCG Chair and other members of the SCG on the scientific, technical, environmental and public health consequences of the incident via a nominated STAC representative
- Develop an agreed risk assessment based on the scientific and technical advice available
- Agree with the SCG Chair on the advice to be given to the public on the health aspects of the incident and advice on actions to protect the public, including the consequences of any evacuation or containment policies
- Pool available information and arrive, as far as possible, at a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different courses of action
- Fully document the issues, risk assessment, decisions, actions, advice to SCG

- As the incident progresses, brief SCG on the extent of the evidence base available, and how the situation might develop, what this means, and the likely effect of various mitigation strategies
- Monitor the responding science and technical community to deliver SCG high-level objectives
- Agree any divergence from the arrangements for providing science and technical input
- Ensure all appropriate expert resource is available to the STAC, liaising with national specialist advisors from agencies represented in the cell and, where warranted, the wider scientific and technical community to ensure the best possible advice is provided
- Provide clarification on advice provided to the SCG, to a single, nominated, point of contact within a multi-agency TCG
- Contribute to the common operating picture and arrangements for joint working.

In the event of a serious disruptive challenge to effective telecommunications, a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) will be convened by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). This may be a stand-alone STAC for a telecommunications infrastructure failure, or a Communications Advice Cell, reporting to the STAC during any Major Incident in which communications are affected

In a complex emergency with widespread implications the STAC may be multi-disciplinary and cover a broad range of technical areas e.g. health, transport and utilities. In this instance a Telecoms Working Group may be established to facilitate technical discussion with a representative(s) then participating in the STAC.

7.2 Media briefing Centre

To effectively manage the media response during a major incident, it may be necessary to establish a Media Cell. The Media Cell, located at the most senior Coordinating Centre, in consultation with the senior Coordinating Group established, will advise and assist in the co-ordination of the overall media response.

Media channels should be used to provide advice and reassurance to the public. A media management plan for Cheshire has been adopted by all agencies (the Cheshire Resilience Forum's Communications and Engagement Protocol) and will come in to effect during any major incident. The protocol is intended to ensure that:

- timely and accurate information is passed to the media by each agency and organisation;
- the flow of information is coordinated between agencies; and
- facilities are provided for the media, ensuring that they do not hamper the operational effectiveness of the agencies.

The protocol provides guidance on managing media interest in an emergency and working with the media to warn and inform the public. All agencies should be familiar with the operating principles contained within it, and the requirements for emergency preparedness outlined in it in line with civil contingency legislation

7.3 Recovery Working Group

Consideration of recovery issues should be part regarded as a key element of any overall response to an incident. In any major emergency early consideration should be given to identifying and anticipating recovery issues and the formation of the Recovery Working Group (RWG) at an appropriate time – and not simply at the end of the response phase. The aim is to return the community and infrastructure to normality.

Transition and Formal Handover - The transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase will be dependent on the unique circumstances of the incident and will be agreed between the Local Authority and Police, either at the Joint Tactical Coordinating Centre (JTCG) or the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) (if operational).

The handover of co-ordination of the incident from the Police to the Local Authorities must be formally recorded. At this stage the co-ordination of the response will be led by the appropriate Local Authority.

Chairing the Recovery Working Group (RWG) - The Local Authorities will, depending on the scale and nature of the recovery issues, establish and chair a Recovery Working Group (RWG), after consultation with other agencies.

Although it is difficult to predict in advance what issues the Recovery Working Group will need to consider, they will probably include the following:

- social impacts;
- health and wellbeing impacts;
- economic impacts;
- environmental impacts.

7.4 Mass Fatalities Coordination Group

A ***mass fatalities incident*** is defined as any incident where the number of those who have died is greater than normal local preparedness arrangements can manage.

Although overall responsibility for fatalities lies with the coroner in whose district the victims are found, different stages will be led by different organisations (e.g., body recovery is primarily a police responsibility, establishment of the emergency mortuary will be led by the Local Authority, management of the operations within the mortuary will involve the police, forensic experts and mortuary managers).

It is imperative, therefore, that the key organisations work together closely and ensure that supporting organisations (e.g., funeral directors and private contractors) are fully engaged throughout. The Cheshire Resilience Forum Mass Fatalities Plan details the arrangements in place, including the establishment of the Mass Fatalities Coordination Group, to oversee the various aspects of the response to an incident which results in a large number of fatalities.

7.5 Multi Agency Information Cell

The purpose of the MAIC is to provide situational awareness by gathering information, analysing and then delivering it in an intelligible and recognised product, referred to as the Common Operating Picture (COP). It is essential that the COP is made as widely available as possible to those involved in the incident and especially the Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs) and Tactical Co-ordinating Groups (TCGs). Collating and sharing any product in the most timely and efficient method is key to ensuring a successful outcome for the MAIC.

The resourcing and operation of a MAIC should be based on the needs of the incident and be flexible according to need. People with information management and analysis skills will be required to identify, source, analyse, display and disseminate information. Resilience Direct skills will be essential.

8. Scene Management

8.1 Cordons

Cordons are established around the scene for the following reasons:

- to guard the scene;
- to protect the public;
- to control the sightseers;
- to prevent unauthorised interference with evidence or property;
- to facilitate the operations of the emergency services.

Cordons will normally be established by Cheshire Constabulary and Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service as appropriate.

- the **inner** cordon provides immediate security of the hazard area and potential crime scene
- the **outer** cordon seals off an extensive area around the inner cordon.

In the event of an incident on the rail infrastructure then British Transport Police and Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service will be responsible for the inner cordon. The perimeters of cordons will be subject to Dynamic Risk Assessments by Cheshire Constabulary / British Transport Police and Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service and will be dependent on the type and scale of the incident.

In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. This includes the crossing of a police cordon.

8.1.1 Inner Cordon

- Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service has responsibility for safety management of all personnel within the inner cordon except for a terrorist incident. Where an incident occurs upon the railway network then Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service would be responsible during the rescue phase, after which responsibility would pass to British Transport Police ;
- Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service will log all personnel entering or leaving the inner cordon.

8.1.2 Outer Cordon

- Cheshire Constabulary will control all access and exit points to the outer cordon;
- The command / control vehicles of the emergency services should be positioned between the inner and outer cordons, as will the Rendezvous Point (RVP) and Marshalling Area;
- It should be noted that the necessity for and location of the RVP and Marshalling areas will be dependent on the location and nature of the incident
- Diversions and traffic management may be established to restrict vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.

8.2 Rendezvous Point (RVP)

- A Rendezvous Point will be established within the outer cordon to provide an area for all agencies to attend prior to deployment at the incident and will be under the control of a Police Officer.

8.3 Marshalling Area

- Marshalling Area may be established under the control of an officer from the emergency services. This area is for resources not immediately required at the scene, or which, having served their purpose, are being held for future use. It should, therefore, be an area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles.

8.4 Forward Command Post (FCP)

- A Forward Command Post should be established at or near to the scene attended by the responding agencies. The Forward Command Post is the focal point for the on-scene management of the emergency.



8.5 Health & Safety at the Scene

The responsibility for health and safety of personnel at a major incident rests with each agency. Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service is responsible for safety management within the inner cordon and advice given must be acted on by all emergency services. If Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service identify the need to evacuate the area, then all emergency agencies personnel must comply with the instruction. The safety advisors may also need to liaise with Local Authority Environmental Health Officers and any Health and Safety Executive Inspectors who may wish to visit the scene.

8.6 Casualties

The strict definition of the term 'casualty' includes anyone directly involved in and affected by an incident. Casualties therefore fall into the following categories:

- Injured
- Uninjured
- Evacuees
- Deceased

8.7 Evacuations

Some emergencies may require the evacuation of large numbers of people. The decision to evacuate must be carefully considered to ensure that sufficient resources are available and that the evacuation does not place those concerned in greater danger. Evacuation is coordinated by Cheshire Constabulary and is usually undertaken on the advice of the Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service or following consultation with partners prior to any decision to evacuate. In some circumstances, personnel from all agencies may have to assist in carrying it out. The appropriate Local Authority must be informed immediately the decision to evacuate is taken or being considered.

A suitable Evacuation Assembly Point will need to be established and rest centres may need to be set up by the local authority. Evacuation, by its nature, is difficult due to people self-evacuating prior to the arrival of the emergency services. Where possible details of people should be noted at the scene and collated.

8.8 Vulnerable People

During any Major Incident there will be people who are vulnerable due to their circumstances, either personal or situational, as well as those people who have become vulnerable due to the nature of the incident and the response to that incident. Although persons classed as vulnerable may differ according to the nature of the incident the definition of vulnerable people should be considered as *'those that are less able to help themselves in the circumstances of an emergency'* (HM Government , 2012).

All agencies should have processes in place to identify Vulnerable people and any command group should consider this issue at an early stage. The early establishment of a Vulnerable Persons Cell (VPC) may assist in coordinating this process.

8.9 Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC)

The Survivor Reception Centre is a secure area in which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid. This should be a premises near to the scene of the incident and will be identified dynamically following an incident. Information will usually be gathered by police documentation teams and interviews undertaken where necessary. It may be established and run initially by the emergency services – who will be first on the scene – until the local authority becomes engaged in the response which may involve activation of the voluntary sector.

8.10 Emergency Rest Centre

In the event of a major emergency where shelter is required for the people directly involved in that emergency the Local Authorities may open a Rest Centre. All Local Authorities have premises identified that can be utilised as a rest centre and have staff trained to manage the centre. Other agencies form part of the response, and management of the rest centre, and these include the police, the NHS and voluntary agencies.

8.11 Friends and Relatives Reception Centre

In the immediate aftermath of an incident people may travel to the scene or to meeting points such as travel terminals if they believe their family or friends may have been involved in an emergency. If necessary, the police, in consultation with the local authority, will establish a Friends & Relatives Reception Centre at a suitable location, to help reunite family and friends with survivors – it will provide the capacity to register, interview and provide shelter for family and friends. These may be near the scene, in the area of the community affected or at arrival and departure points.

Any commercial, industrial or other organisations concerned may also need to be consulted as they may have a role in providing assistance. Friends & Relatives Reception Centres will be staffed by police, local authority staff and suitably trained voluntary organisations. The authorities should also consult and involve representatives of faith communities whenever appropriate. Interpreters may also be required.

8.12 Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HAC)

The purpose of the Humanitarian Assistance Centre is to:

- act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved families and friends and survivors, and where appropriate to anyone else who has been affected;
- enable those affected to gain as much information as is currently available about missing family members and friends;
- enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, which enhances the ability to identify loved ones quickly;
- offer access to a range of facilities that will allow families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs; and
- ensure a seamless multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that should minimise duplication.

The provision of a Humanitarian Assistance Centre will be a decision for the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). Local Authorities have identified premises suitable for this purpose.

8.13 Casualty Bureau

The police may establish a Casualty Bureau as soon as practicable where details on all evacuees, uninjured, injured and deceased will be collated. At the same time they will take enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident. Casualty Bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries. Where a match is made they will contact the enquirer and inform them of the condition and whereabouts of the person concerned. Police will review each case to determine the most appropriate means of providing relevant information and will be delivered by a personal visit where necessary.

To avoid discrepancies in casualty figures all information must be routed through the Casualty Bureau, which will be the sole source of casualty information. Casualty figures must only be released following consultation with the appropriate Coordinating Group.

8.14 Holding Audit Area

In the event of a disaster involving multiple fatalities it may be necessary to set up a 'Holding Audit Area' close to the incident. Should normal mortuary facilities prove insufficient it may then become necessary to activate additional emergency mortuary facilities. This decision will be taken by the Coroner in conjunction with the Police Senior Investigating Officer and the Local Authority. Local Authorities have identified suitable premises for body-holding and emergency mortuary purposes.

9. Stand down, Debriefing & Learning

9.1 Incident Stand Down Procedure

If a multi-agency response scales down, or if the response to the initial incident which caused the declaration of a multi-agency 'major incident' or 'major incident standby' has resulted in its effective conclusion, consideration should then be given to ***stand down*** the response.

The decision to stand down the response phase to an incident should be made by the Chair of the senior Coordinating Group which has been established. The decision to stand down should be made at the senior Coordinating Group's meeting, with the members of the senior Coordinating Group all being asked their opinion.

Once the decision has been made to stand down the multi-agency emergency response, this decision needs to be communicated to ***all*** responders who have been notified of the 'major incident' / 'major incident standby' notification – even those who were notified but did not attend the JTCG / SCG. The following notification should be used (as appropriate):

a) **'MAJOR INCIDENT STAND DOWN'**; or
b) **'MAJOR INCIDENT STANDBY STAND DOWN'**.

In accordance with the *Notification Diagram for Emergencies*, shown in section 6.3, the organisation which notified a responder of the declaration of a major incident / major incident standby is also responsible for ensuring that they are notified of stand down.
In making the stand down decision it is recognised that:

- individual agencies may still need to maintain their own agency's emergency response (i.e., as an incident may have a greater, more direct impact on some agencies than on others);
- some aspects of multi-agency working may need to continue, for example, Recovery Working Group (RWG)

Each agency remains responsible for recording the actions and decisions made as part of its own continuing emergency response.

9.2 Incident Debriefing

At the conclusion of any incident consideration should be given to identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the response through incident debrief. It is good practice that two types of incident debrief take place:

hot debrief – which should take place in the immediate aftermath of the decision to stand-down the multi-agency response and before responders have left the site of the incident / the appropriate Coordinating Centre. Responders should be asked to consider lessons learnt – both what worked and what didn't – while it is still fresh in people's memory. Each agency should also hold its own hot debrief.

Structured debrief – which should normally take place within 4 weeks of an incident occurring. A meeting will be organised to which all responders will be invited to provide feedback on both their own agency's response and also the multi-agency response arrangements. The multi-agency cold debrief will normally take place after each individual agency's cold debrief, in order to be able to consider any lessons

learnt that have arisen out of these agency specific debriefs which may impact on multi-agency arrangements.

Whilst individual agencies may have their own debrief procedures, CRF arrangements will be used for the Multi Agency Debrief to identify the following:

- any multi-agency processes, procedures or plans need to be amended and Where appropriate procedures may be amended or updated;

- any of the risk scores and controls in the Community Risk Register need to be amended or updated.

Debriefs should not interfere with or comment on investigations into the incident carried out by investigative or judicial authorities. It is important to realise that such debriefs and related documents may be disclosable to individuals involved in legal proceedings and through Freedom of Information Act requests.

9.3 Joint Organisational Learning

The lessons identified from de-briefing activities are now at the forefront of many key changes in emergency response policy and practices. Previously issues have been identified but not successfully acted upon to improve effective joint working. Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) is accepted as the standard for multi-agency learning and is adopted by all response agencies to ensure interoperability is continually improved.

JOL provides emergency services and other responder agencies with a consistent and accountable mechanism to ensure lessons identified are acted on and to ensure they become lessons learned. Notable practice or recommendations identified through multi-agency debriefs and which meet appropriate criteria will be uploaded to JOL via Resilience Direct by the JOL single point of contact.

10. Roles and Responsibilities

This section provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the various responding agencies.

10.1 Cheshire Constabulary:

- save life and prevent further loss of life, in conjunction with the other emergency services.
- prevent escalation of the incident.
- coordinate the response phase of the incident (some exceptions apply).
- coordinate and communicate between the emergency services, local authorities and other supporting organisations, both at the scene of the incident and elsewhere – this includes activation of the tactical and strategic coordination groups (TCG & SCG).
- secure, protect and preserve the scene.
- provide traffic management and identify evacuation routes (in consultation with the highways authorities and local authority).
- investigate any criminal offences, obtaining and securing evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable.
- collate and disseminate casualty information.
- coordinate the provision of public information, in conjunction with other agencies.
- recover, identify, reconcile and repatriate the deceased in a timely and dignified manner on behalf of the coroner.
- prevent and detect crime.
- conduct a thorough investigation with appropriate authorities.
- lead the establishment of a survivor reception centre and a family and friends reception centre.
- establish documentation teams.
- develop an accurate and coordinated media plan.
- restore 'new normality' to the community.

10.2 British Transport Police (BTP):

- saving of live, together with the other emergency services;
- co-ordination of work of the emergency services and other organisations;
- protection and preservation of evidence and the scene;
- collation and dissemination of casualty information;
- investigation of the incident in conjunction with other investigative bodies, e.g., HMRI (ORR) and RAIB;
- protection / recovery / preservation of property;
- identification of any victims;
- restoration of normality with other agencies and organisations; and
- submission and compilation of evidence in the final report to the appropriate authorities, e.g., Senior Coroner for Cheshire, Public Inquiry, Crown Prosecution Service, etc.

- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.3 Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service (CFRS):

- life-saving through search and rescue;
- fire fighting and fire protection;
- assisting with humanitarian services;
- the management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment;
- salvage and damage control;
- safety management within the inner cordon;
- control and management of decontamination arrangements and
- provide hazardous materials support/advice through Hazardous Materials Environmental Protection Officers (HMEPO).
- contributes to the development of the multi-agency Dynamic Risk Assessment that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared;
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.4 North West Ambulance Service (NWAS):

- the saving of life in conjunction with the other emergency services;
- protecting the health, safety and welfare of all health service personnel on site;
- carrying out a health service assessment of the incident, alerting the main receiving hospitals and notifying wider health partners;
- instigating a triage process followed by treatment and transport of casualties to an appropriate facility;
- provision of clinical decontamination of casualties and support to mass decontamination at the incident site;
- mobilisation of the UK national capability, as appropriate to the Ambulance Service;
- alerting and coordinating the work of the Voluntary Aid Societies (VAS) enabling them to provide medical services appropriate to the incident as required;
- provision of the Medical Emergency Response Incident Team (MERIT);
- provision of specialist operations capabilities to rescue and treat casualties from hazardous areas; and
- maintenance of core business in line with a mission of 'Delivering the right care, at the right time, in the right place'
- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.5 NHS:

The NHS consists of a number of organisations locally, each with specific statutory response roles. Cheshire and Merseyside(C&M) Integrated Care Board (ICB) also known as NHS Cheshire and Merseyside has responsibility for coordinating the response of local NHS organisations to any incident.

Cheshire and Merseyside ICB

During an emergency the NHS Cheshire and Merseyside coordinates and, if required, commands and controls NHS resources. The ICB:

- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared and whether a Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) is established (as appropriate):
- attends the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). They will also invite colleagues of the area affected to attend the TCG if appropriate;

When attending multi-agency groups, the role of the ICB is to:

- represent all NHS organisations in Cheshire and Merseyside;
- coordinate the response of local NHS organisations and providers of NHS funded care - providing strategic direction as necessary on the use of local NHS resources, through NHS command and control mechanisms (including North West Ambulance Service);
- liaise with and coordinate the response of NHS services which provide a service within the ICB footprint;
- liaise with NHS England North West to arrange for mutual aid to local health services from across the region / nationally (if required);

Working with local NHS organisations the ICB coordinates any NHS response to:

- ensure provision in appropriate clinical settings for the treatment of people with injuries, including those with minor injuries;
- ensure provision of care and advice to evacuees, survivors and relatives, including replacement medication;
- assist acute trusts to increase bed capacity by supporting accelerated discharge of patients with the support of community trust and local authorities;
- assess the effects of the incident on vulnerable persons;
- cascade public health and treatment advice to health professionals and NHS organisations;
- coordinate any necessary local arrangements for mass distribution of counter measures (prophylactics, vaccines, antibiotics);
- ensure the implementation of any necessary measures to support screening, epidemiology, long term assessment and management of the effects of the incident;
- ensure the provision of psychological and mental health support in conjunction with the appropriate provider;

- continue to provide essential services; and
- work with the local authority and community to support the recovery phase.

NHS Provider Organisations

Acute Trusts - during an incident are responsible for:

- providing a clinical response including provision of general support and specific / specialist health care to all casualties, victims and responders;
- providing appropriate support to any designated receiving hospital or other neighbouring service that is substantially affected; and
- decontamination of self-presenting casualties.

Community Health Providers – during an incident are responsible for:

- providing assistance as necessary at any emergency centre opened, e.g. Rest Centre, Humanitarian Assistance Centre;
- ensuring that vulnerable persons are identified and assisted; and
- supporting acute hospitals and maintaining services.

Mental Health Trusts – during an incident are responsible for:

- coordination and directly providing the psychological and mental health support to staff, patients and relatives in conjunction with partner agencies where appropriate; and
- advising on the long term effects of psychological trauma associated with the incident and recommend the appropriate level of psychological intervention where required.

NHS England

NHS England North West will:

- Manage the response to incidents affecting the North West region
- respond to requests from the C&M ICB to assist and co-operate with the incident response and recovery.
- support with the provision of mutual aid or specialist resources to local health services from across the region / nationally (if required)
- attend the TCG and / or SCG alongside the ICB representatives (as required);
- work with the ICB and NHS providers to maintain service delivery across their local health economy and the region; and
- work with the ICB, local authority and community to support the recovery phase (as required); and
- manage NHS requests for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA);
- coordinate and manage information requests from national colleagues;
- lead the NHS response to counter terrorism or security incidents

10.6 UK Health Security Agency:

- The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) is an executive agency, sponsored by the Department of Health and Social Care. The UKHSA is responsible for planning, preventing and responding to external health threats, and providing intellectual, scientific and operational leadership at national and local level, as well as on the global stage. UKHSA fulfils the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care's duty as a Category 1 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

- The UKHSA provides an integrated approach to protecting UK public health through the provision of public health support and advice to a range of stakeholders including the NHS, local authorities, emergency services, other arms-length bodies, the Department of Health and Social Care and devolved administrations, working in partnership with other organisations to protect the public.

Specialist advice areas include

- Infectious diseases
- Outbreak surveillance
- Chemical, biological and radiation hazards including deliberate release (CBRNe)
- Health aspects of extreme natural events.

In the event of a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) being required, contact must be made with the local HPT. A STAC provides a single point of scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). The local HPT Deputy Director or On-Call Consultant in Health Protection will advise on and/or agree the need for a STAC, which will be chaired and administered by UKHSA.

The LRF STAC Plan can be found at:

https://collaborate.resilience.gov.uk/RDService/home/21113/10.-Plans

10.7 Local Authorities:

There are four local authorities in Cheshire:

- Cheshire East Council;
- Cheshire West and Chester Council;
- Halton Borough Council;
- Warrington Borough Council.

As part of the Notification Risk Assessment only the Local Authority in whose area an incident has occurred will be notified. If an incident affects the whole of Cheshire, e.g., severe weather, then all Local Authorities will be notified.

- arranging and implementing traffic diversions and road closures in conjunction with Cheshire Constabulary;
- support the arrangements to evacuate Schools and Vulnerable groups;
- arranging for the provision of emergency transportation;
- providing short term shelter through provision and management of reception / rest centres;
- coordinating as necessary the longer-term accommodation for evacuees and the homeless;

- activating the Local Authority Emergency Centre (LAEC) to coordinate the authority's response;
- undertaking public health duties, including assisting in the provision and management of premises for any mass anti-viral / vaccination / prophylaxis centre (if required);
- assisting in the establishment of any local information, enquiry points, and Media Briefing Centre if required;
- maintaining contact points with local organisations, voluntary sector suppliers, contractors and other public sector organisations, whose services and resources may be sought to assist the Local Authority response;
- supplying any information or advice, which may assist the emergency services / responders with regards to the construction of structures, highway drainage, roads, bridges etc.
- coordinating a crisis support service if necessary;
- in consultation with Cheshire Constabulary, providing and managing a Friends and Relatives Reception Centre (FRRC);
- providing and managing facilities for a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) if required;
- make provision for appropriate facilities to be used as an Emergency Mortuary in the event of a mass fatalities incident;
- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.8 Environment Agency (EA):

- prevent or minimise the impact of the incident
- investigate the cause of the incident and consider enforcement action
- To seek remediation, clean-up or restoration of the environment.

The role of the Environment Agency at an incident depends on the nature of the event.

In a flood event - it focuses on operational issues such as issuing flood warnings, predicting the location, timing and magnitude of flooding and operating its flood defence assets to protect communities and critical infrastructure. Further details on the response to flooding incidents in Cheshire can be found in the individual Local Authority Flood Response Plans

In a pollution incident - it will seek to prevent/control and monitor the input of pollutants to the environment. In emergencies involving major air pollution the EA will coordinate a multi-agency Air Quality Cell to provide interpreted air quality information

In a COMAH Incident - will have role as Joint Competent Authority(with HSE) under regulations

In other emergencies - (such as animal disease outbreaks), its principal role is usually to regulate and provide advice and support on waste disposal issues.

10.9 Maritime and Coastguard Agency:

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. The MCA's Directorate of Operations includes HM Coastguard (responsible for civil maritime search and rescue) and the Counter Pollution and Response Branch.

HM Coastguard has the primacy for the initiation and coordination of civil maritime search and rescue within the UK Search and Rescue (SAR) region as directed by Parliament under the Coastguard Act 1925. HM Coastguard has 345 Coastguard Rescue Teams located throughout the United Kingdom that are available 24 hours a day, 365 days per year.

HM Coastguard provides a capability and supporting role to other responders under the Civil Contingencies Act for inland Search and Rescue.

HM Coastguard has the operational primacy for all Search and Rescue helicopters within the United Kingdom which are coordinated and deployed from Aeronautical Rescue located within the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Fareham. Along with this, HMCG is responsible for the delivery of six internationally identified functions:

1. Search and Rescue
2. Maritime Safety
3. Maritime Security
4. Counter Pollution
5. Vessel Traffic Monitoring
6. Accident and Disaster Response

Capability

- Water Rescue
- Mud Rescue
- Casualty Care
- Coastal Search
- Land Search
- Flood Rescue
- Ordinance
- Helicopter Operations
- Communications - maritime VHF throughout the Irish Sea
- Communications – Airwave
- 4x4 Vehicles
- All Terrain Vehicles
- Lifeboats & Hovercraft (RNLI) and independent inshore rescue boats
- HM Coastguard SAR Helicopters

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency also has the capability to respond to the following incidents:

- Pollution
- Adverse weather
- Displaced persons- mass evacuation and migrants
- Maritime mass rescue operations
- Major transport accidents
- COMAH accidents
- Terrorism and maritime security
- CNI disruption
- Infectious disease outbreak or pandemic

10.10 Port Health Authority

The Port Health Authority is responsible for the control of Infectious diseases, food safety, pest control, waste management and environmental protection in the waterways of the Manchester Ship Canal and the River Weaver as far as Winsford Bridge. It is responsible for the surveillance of all shipping in those waterways and docks associated with them in respect of any issues which may affect public health.

During a multi-agency response the Port Health Authority also:

- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is;
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.11 Senior Coroner for Cheshire

The Senior Coroner for the district where the bodies are lying will:

- in consultation with his relevant Council and Chief officer of police, initiate the establishment of the emergency mortuary;
- authorise the removal of bodies;
- authorise the examination of bodies to find a cause of death;
- chair the Identification Commission and take all reasonable steps to identify the deceased;
- where necessary, organise the collection of data concerning those bodies which may be irrecoverable but who are believed to have died in the event;
- liaise and co-operate with other coroners who may also have, in their districts, bodies from the same event;
- authorise the release of those bodies after appropriate examination and documentation is complete;
- at all times, liaise with the relevant emergency services and government departments.

The Senior Coroner for Cheshire takes the lead, working in conjunction with Warrington Borough Council, for the development of mass fatality arrangements.

During the multi-agency response to a mass fatalities incident in Cheshire, the Senior Coroner also:

- is invited to attend the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);
- chairs the Mass Fatalities Coordinating Group and oversees the implementation of the Cheshire Resilience Forum (CRF) Mass Fatalities Plan.

10.12 Utility Companies

The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be coordinated by Cheshire Constabulary in the first instance. They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.

During a multi-agency response Utility Companies also:

- contribute to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

United Utilities Role
United Utilities are responsible for the provision of water supply, and provision of wastewater drainage and treatment.

Emergency Response
If necessary, United Utilities will:

- Establish an Incident in their Integrated Control Centre (ICC) at Lingley Mere, Warrington;
- Provide a Liaison Officer at any Incident Control Centre established;
- Monitor mains water supplies and wastewater network and advise the Incident Control Centre of the results;
- Provide information to the public concerning the safety of mains water supplies;
- Deal with enquiries from the media in accordance with the policy and arrangements contained in the Plan.
- Provide advice on water and wastewater related issues to other agencies involved in the response to the incident
- Provide specialist advice on water and waste water regulations
- Provide advice on water and wastewater related issues to other agencies involved in the response to the incident and provide support to STAC where necessary
- Provide local responders with all relevant information to the response including:
    - The scale of the problem,
    - Estimated timescales to repair
    - The appropriate water quality information.
- Liaise with health sector on appropriate measures to mitigate the risk to public health through the appropriate advisory team

If a loss of water, United Utilities has a Priority Services Register of vulnerable people who will be our priority and then there are also arrangements to provide alternative water to our other customers.

10.13 Transport Companies
The transport operators can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and / or the local authorities. This includes rail, road, air and shipping operators.

- subject to the Dynamic Risk Assessment of those agencies to be notified, attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.14 National Highways England (NH)
For serious and major road traffic incidents on the motorway network in Cheshire where appropriate a *Silver Command Centre* will be established at the National Highways Regional Operations Centre (ROC) under the command of a Police Commander and a NH Operations Manager. The North West Motorway Police Group (NWMPG) control room is co-located within the National Highways Regional Operations Centre (ROC) in Newton-Le-Willows and incident details are exchanged using a command and control log interface system which provides an effective and timely two way exchange of incident information. The primary focus of the Regional Operations Centre (ROC) is to supplement the management and recovery of the incident.

National Highways will adopt a coordinated approach with their Service Providers to:

- provide support to the emergency services on incidents that occur on the Strategic Road Network (motorways and some trunk roads);

- liaise with Local Authorities regarding diversion routes to mitigate the effects of additional traffic using the non-core routes;
- release, where practicable, traffic trapped at the scene;
- use resources to mitigate the effects of an emergency;
- once the scene is handed to National Highways and it becomes a National Highways led incident. The recovery phase will then be coordinated by National Highways including any repair to the infrastructures.

During a multi-agency response National Highways also:

- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared and whether a Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) is established (as appropriate);
- attends/participates in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);
- should a Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) also be established (e.g., severe weather), the Regional Operations Centre (ROC) will maintain close contact with the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG);

10.15 Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

The Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) role is set out in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (i.e., to act as the regulator to require that the risks from work activities are correctly assessed and controlled). The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has a duty to provide advice on how the Act may be complied with.

In addition to this the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has a duty as a Category 2 Responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005, with a duty to provide relevant technical or specialist advice. This includes information on the nature of any potential hazards of the site / organisation. In addition the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) includes:

- any assessment of the level of risk must, in the first instance, be for the duty holder or industry specialist representative in conjunction with Category 1 Responders. However, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) will become involved if the duty holder is unavailable or doesn't hold the confidence of the emergency services / the public;

- the principles of the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) response apply to all areas of HSE work except nuclear incidents. Whilst the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is designated a Category 2 Responder, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) are the equivalent of a Category 1 Responder for nuclear incidents;

- having a 24/7 response to incidents that includes a decision maker who will assess the initial incident and determine the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) approach and deployment of resource;

- using best endeavours to respond to any reasonable request for information or a response at site / command centres, to an ongoing live incident. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) cannot guarantee attendance out of hours but as a minimum we will offer telephone advice;

- Proportionate arrangements (i.e. a Duty Officer and an up to date list of telephone contacts) are in place via regional plans to allow the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) representatives to access telephone advice from "experts" within the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Health and Safety Laboratory and from third parties with identified expertise. Experts will not be on a call–out rota and physical attendance is not guaranteed but is again on a best endeavours basis.

During a multi-agency response the Health and Safety Executive (HSE):

- will proactively contact those leading the response to an incident to make them aware of what support the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) can provide (even if not notified).

- the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has an interest in identifying and requesting the securing of all, or part, of the scene of an industrial incident, which may be important for evidence. This will usually be when any primary emergency service response is complete and it is safe to do so.

10.16 Military (HQ North West)

In response to requests for assistance, Defence may contribute in six main roles, or functions. These are:

- Command and control
- Liaison
- Planning
- Specialist advice and capability
- General and non-specialist support
- Education and training

Additionally, the military may be able to assist with some of the following specialist and non-specialist tasks:

- evacuation tasks;
- engineering tasks;
- logistic and administrative support including transport lift
- Air transport/lift capabilities

Military assistance during an incident is governed by the *Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)* arrangements. These arrangements, as well as the details of the military response capability, are described in more detail in MOD Joint Doctrine Publication 2 UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience (Fourth Edition)

During a multi-agency response the Military also:

- Attends/participates (if requested) in the multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)
- Attends/participates (if requested) in the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG)

10.17 Met Office

In a major weather-related incident the Met Office will;

- via its Regional Advisor, brief all relevant partners on the ongoing meteorological situation and potential impacts, including reference to all severe weather warnings and Flood Guidance Statements in force at the time;
- via its Environment Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC), issue additional bespoke forecasts/advice and publish all such information on its Hazard Manager website.

During a multi-agency response the Met Office also:

- contributes to the development of the multi-agency *Dynamic Risk Assessment* that considers whether a 'Major Incident / Standby' is declared.
- attends the Joint Tactical Coordinating Group (JTCG) / Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG);

10.18 Resilience & Emergencies Division (RED)

As defined in the Central Government's Concept of Operations (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations), the primary role of Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities' Resilience and Emergency Division (DLUHC-RED) in response is to provide the link between Local Resilience Forums' (LRF) Strategic Coordination Groups (SCG) and the central government response structures.

In most circumstances this link will be provided by a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) dialling into an SCG remotely but, where emergencies are limited to a single or small number of LRFs, DLUHC-RED will endeavour to physically deploy a GLO or Government Liaison Team (GLT) to the LRF's Strategic Coordination Centre.

During a wide area emergency (and if requested by the local tier), DLUHC-RED will consider establishing a Response Coordination Group (ResCG) call to assist with information sharing across multiple LRFs.

10.19 Voluntary Sector

Members of the voluntary sector often have an important role to play in the response to an emergency. Engagement should be conducted at an early stage of response and supporting agencies should be included within Tactical and Strategic Coordination Groups.

Category 1 Responders will coordinate the voluntary sector response to requests for humanitarian assistance. For larger incidents, the voluntary sector has a cascade notification and coordination protocol in place. When considering utilising the voluntary sector it is recommended that early notification is given to the voluntary sector which will allow time for contact and deployment.

The voluntary sector within Cheshire have strong links with Local Authorities and the Resilience Forum. The roles they may perform may differ slightly, but a complete list of their capabilities is included in the CRF CEVAC Voluntary Agency Profiles and summarised in the CRF CEVAC Matrix. These documents are accessible via Local Authorities.

Community Resilience – the voluntary sector is committed to building local community resilience in Cheshire, working with partners in both Local Authorities and the wider Resilience Forum.

A summary of the capabilities of the various Voluntary agencies can be found in the following table:

Voluntary Sector Organisations and Capabilities

Organisation	Attributes
BGEA Rapid Response Chaplains	Emotional/psychological support Spiritual support
British Red Cross	Welfare, Practical support Emotional/psychological support Comms, Admin, Support Line, Disaster Appeal
Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service Volunteers	Welfare, Transport, Comms, Admin
Cheshire Search & Rescue	Welfare,Emotional/Psychological Medical, Search & Rescue, Comms,Admin
Islamic Relief UK	Welfare, Catering, Practical support Emotional/psychological support Shelter, Spiritual support, Disaster Appeal
Macclesfield & Congleton Scouts	Welfare, Medical, Search & Rescue, Comms, Admin, Shelter
North West 4x4 Response	Welfare, Medical, Search & Rescue Transport, Comms
Rapid Relief Team	Welfare, Admin, Catering, Practical Support, Disaster Appeal, Medical
Raynet	Comms
Response Pastors	Emotional/psychological support, Spiritual support
Rotary	Welfare, Admin
RSPCA Control Centre	Animal Welfare, Animal Search & Rescue
Salvation Army	Welfare,Emotional/Psychological support, Transport, Admin
Samaritans – Macclesfield & District	Welfare, Support Line Emotional/Psychological support
St John Ambulance	Medical, Transport, Comms

Appendix A
LIST OF LOCAL ORGANISATIONS

Category 1 Responders	Category 2 Responders
• British Transport Police • Cheshire Constabulary • Cheshire East Council • Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service • Cheshire West and Chester Council • Environment Agency • Halton Borough Council • Maritime and Coastguard Agency • NHS England • Cheshire & Merseyside Integrated Care Board • North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust • Port Health Authority • UK Health Security Agency • Warrington Borough Council	• Airports • Electricity Suppliers • Gas Suppliers • Water Suppliers • Harbours and Ports • Health and Safety Executive • Highways England • Public Communications Suppliers • Network Rail • Train Operating Companies • Freight Operating Companies
Other Organisations (but not designated as a Category 1 / 2 Responder)	
• Military – HQ Northwest • Voluntary Sector • Met Office	

Action Card 1

Incident Definitions

A **"*Major Incident*"** is defined by national doctrine as

> ***"an event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies."***

A **"*Major Incident – Standby*"** - is defined as any incident which is NOT a "Major Incident", but:

a) has the potential to develop into a "Major Incident"; or
b) involves contamination of the environment, water courses or air pollution; or
c) involves evacuation or the potential for evacuation of any members of the public; or
d) involves major road closures; or
e) involves the distribution of specific health advice to any members of the public; or
f) has a significant impact on service delivery; or
g) is likely to cause public concern.

"*Primary Cloudburst*"

a) this term would be used in the event of a ***major accident***[2] at a 'Upper Tier' COMAH site involving the release of a toxic gas or other dangerous substance within the COMAH regulations.

b) the declaration is normally made by the site operator but, in light of circumstances, may be made by the senior officer of any emergency services present at the incident. The occurrence must have the potential to affect areas outside the boundary of the premises.

"HEXAFLOW" – is defined as:

a) this term would be used in the event of a ***major accident*** at a REPPIR site involving the release of a toxic gas or other dangerous substance within the REPPIR regulations.

b) the declaration is normally made by the site operator but, in light of circumstances, may be made by the senior officer of any emergency services present at the incident. The occurrence must have the potential to affect areas outside the boundary of the premises.

2 the term ***major accident*** is defined in the COMAH Regulations and is used when an incident involves the release of one or more dangerous substances. Local Authorities have an external emergency plan for each Upper Tier COMAH site.

Action Card 2

Multi Agency Airwave Communications

ESICTRIL talkgroup for Emergency Services Control Rooms

The Emergency Services Inter Control Talkgroup is intended to provide the NW Emergency Services control rooms with the ability to notify each other and share information in response to a wide variety of major and/or critical incidents.

The ESICTRL talkgroup should be used during any spontaneous and pre planned situation that requires the passage of immediate safety critical information between police, fire and ambulance control rooms. This will include the initial tri-service communications during the response to a Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA) (Operation Plato).

The ESICTRL Talkgroup is monitored by all control rooms 24/7

At all times services will refer to themselves on the talkgroup in the format:
<County> then <Service> e.g. “Cheshire Police” or “North West Ambulance”

Receiving services should then acknowledge receipt of the announcement and activate any relevant plans/procedures as necessary for the type of incident.

Multi Agency Blue Light Responders Talkgroups

The following Airwave talkgroups are available for inter-agency Blue Light responders communications:

IC1	**Multi Agency Incident Command (Tactical/Silver)**
ES1	**Emergency Services (Operational/Bronze)**
ES2	**Emergency Services (Operational/Bronze)**
ES3	**Emergency Services (Operational/Bronze)**

Action Card 3

Notification Cascade

When a Major incident or Major Incident Standby has been declared:

a) The Cheshire Police Force Control Centre (FCC), or Contingency Planning Team, will notify partner agencies by sending out a Resilience Direct (RD) Notification to category 1 and 2 agencies which will include the incident METHANE report.

b) In addition, Cheshire Police will telephone Cheshire Fire & Rescue Service, North West Ambulance Service, Environment Agency Control Rooms and the relevant Local Authority Contact Centre to ask them to notify their on duty NILO/officer of the declaration. Brief details of the incident will be provided and directed to the RD Notification for further information.

c) Further agencies will be telephoned, depending on the type of incident, as required.

d) It is for each agency, once notified, to determine the level of their own response subject to their agency's own Dynamic Risk Assessment.



Action Card 4

JESIP Aide Memoirs





Action Card 5

Template Agenda for Multi Agency Strategic and Tactical Coordination Groups

1. Introduction of Attendees, Roles and Responsibilities.

2. Declaration of Items for Urgent Attention.

2a. Decision on Items for Urgent Attention.

If Required Breakout Time To Action Urgent Items As Agreed Above

3. Confirm Current Incident Status
   - Advisory – Information only
   - MIS – Major Incident Standby
   - MI – Major Incident

4. Update on Situation from all partners to develop Common Recognised Information Picture. (C.R.I.P)

5. Review of previous Actions and Minutes.

6. Review and assess Risks inc.
   - Community
   - Responders
   - Environmental
   - Organisational

7. Review and Agree Aim and Objectives (Hierarchically)

8. Consider Powers, Policies and Procedures including multiagency and single agency plans, Media Strategy

9. Identify Options and Contingencies including support cells ie
   - Scientific and Technical Advice Cell
   - Vulnerable People Cell
   - Multi-Agency Information Cell
   - Media and Communications Cell
   - Airwave Tac Advisor

10. Confirmation and Allocation of Actions Required

11. Review Incident Status

12. Date and Time of Next Meeting.